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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

April 19, 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Visit of French President  
Charles de Gaulle

As you know, President de Gaulle will arrive in Washington on Friday, April 22, after a four-day visit to Canada. On Tuesday, April 26, he will leave Washington for New York, after which he will visit San Francisco and New Orleans. He will depart from the United States on Friday, April 29, for the French West Indies.

For use during your talks with President de Gaulle I am enclosing a briefing memorandum covering subjects which he may raise with you, and which you may wish to discuss. You will meet with him alone on Friday afternoon at 4:00 p.m., see him again at Gettysburg on Sunday, and on Monday have a final meeting which Foreign Minister Couve de Murville and I will attend with Ambassadors Houghton and Alphan and Under Secretary Dillon. President de Gaulle will pay a brief farewell call at the White House on Tuesday morning prior to leaving for New York.

You will note that we have suggested in the briefing memorandum that it might be most productive if you were to concentrate with de Gaulle on certain issues relating to the forthcoming summit meeting.

In addition to the briefing memorandum I am enclosing talking points for the subjects mentioned in the memorandum, draft public statements, and selected biographic data on President de Gaulle and the principal members of his party.



*Christian A. Herter*

Christian A. Herter

Enclosures:

Briefing material.

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PRESIDENT'S TALKS WITH DE GAULLE

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BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

De Gaulle's position in France has declined somewhat from the high following his quelling of the Algerian insurrection in January. This is a result of his mishandling of the National Assembly, farmer discontent and, above all, failure to achieve progress on an Algerian settlement. Nevertheless, his position remains commanding and his situation fundamentally impregnable (though the Debré Government is quite unpopular).

From indications which we have, de Gaulle views his forthcoming talks with you generally as an opportunity for a broad survey of world problems, and specifically as one of the final chapters in "pre-summitry", following his own talks with Khrushchev which led to no modifications of French positions on summit issues. French sources have expressed doubts he will raise many detailed issues with you.

You might wish to open your first private conversation on Friday afternoon by stating that you would be interested in hearing General de Gaulle's reaction to the Khrushchev visit. Thereafter, you may wish to go into a general rundown on the world military and strategic scene. As always, de Gaulle will be interested in your views on this subject. You may wish to stress the continuing effectiveness of the US nuclear deterrent and the continuing need for programs to meet a wide range of possible threats, e.g., through NATO shield build-up.

There are of course a host of more specific problems and relatively numerous knotty issues separating us from the French. Since the most urgent item on the international agenda is the Summit Meeting, it is suggested you may wish to concentrate on "summitry". The French believe that further procedural correspondence with Khrushchev on procedural matters should be conducted by them as the host Government. You have, of course, desisted from further correspondence with Khrushchev except on the point of your Lisbon visit.

SUMMIT TACTICS

More specifically, with regard to summit issues, I believe that tactical and procedural questions can be handled largely at the Foreign Ministers' level and we are meeting again on this subject in Istanbul on May 1, though you might wish to allude to your support for small, informal sessions, a concept with which de Gaulle agrees, and briefly to review our general approach to

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the summit. The French apparently continue to feel that no fixed termination date should be set in advance for the Summit. We have informed them of your April 16 letter to Khrushchev concerning your trip to Portugal.

GERMANY AND BERLIN

On Germany and Berlin, I do not believe such differences as exist between the French and ourselves need preclude agreement on Summit handling of Berlin. You may wish principally to reiterate our basic view that the Western powers should seek to "de-fuse" the Berlin problem by seeking to stabilize the situation for a period. De Gaulle believes that we need to hold firm in Berlin and has recently taken quite a stiff line with Khrushchev.

DISARMAMENT

A. TACTICS - On disarmament we expect that existing Franco-American differences would not become apparent in the summit discussions of the subject. The French stress on nuclear disarmament, their insistence on early steps towards controlling delivery systems, and opposition to conventional disarmament are of course well-known, but we do not anticipate that detailed discussions of broad disarmament plans will occur. It is now thought more likely that we would single out some specific disarmament proposal at the summit; for example, one concerning the peaceful uses of outer space is a possibility. We do not exclude possible U.S. initiatives concerning missiles or nuclear weapons since we feel that US-French differences even in these areas can be effectively submerged. It is therefore suggested that you indicate awareness of differences but state these seem unlikely to affect the summit, where we hope for agreement on limited Western proposals with further talks to follow at the Geneva Ten-Power meeting.

B. PHILOSOPHY - You may wish to take this opportunity to elaborate on our basic approach toward arms control, stressing the need for an initial program of limited steps to stabilize the military environment and reduce the risk of war while we strive for more basic progress in disarmament. You might particularly emphasize our concern at the possibility of war by miscalculation and stress the importance of agreement on inspection and other safeguards which would be designed to

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reduce this danger. You might also wish to indicate our concern at the possible danger of a spread of nuclear weapons capabilities beyond countries already active in this field.

### EAST-WEST RELATIONS

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The final summit topic is East-West relations generally and here there are differences with the French. It is suggested you indicate we believe the major purpose of your talks with de Gaulle are to ensure our not proceeding to the summit in disarray. In this context you could reiterate opposition to the concept of Four-Power (including the USSR) aid to under-developed countries. You could also mention that we do not deem practical control over arms deliveries to other areas, e.g., West Africa or the Arab states and Israel, with the Soviets, though of course we would not oppose an effort to persuade Khrushchev of the advantages of mutual restraint in arms deliveries to disturbed areas. Nor would we object to a possible statement that the Summit powers would conform their arms deliveries to any arms control agreements that might be reached by countries in these areas. Finally, we believe that the Declaration of Principles which the French have been pushing in the Paris committee meetings on this subject is likewise subject to misinterpretation and might cause the whole summit to bog down on a definition of principles and never make any further progress. You could note that we are in agreement to working further in Paris on a purely Western declaration for background purposes.

### NUCLEAR TEST SUSPENSION TALKS

It is not recommended that you raise this issue, since it is unlikely that de Gaulle can be won over to our views. The Foreign Minister told us last week that if, at the time of the summit, there should appear to be near-agreement on a test suspension ban, he would of course expect that we would discuss this matter tripartitely with the UK and the Soviets, and without the French.

### TRIPARTITION

At some point in your talks, there will inevitably arise the concept of French "Grandeur", France's role in the world,

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etc. This, in turn, leads to tripartitism. It is suggested that you pay tribute to the French renaissance of the world scene, and indicate that the whole background of summit arrangements proves that France is obviously playing a role in this context on a par with the US and UK. Furthermore, you could indicate we supported this role. On tripartitism you could mention again our aversion to institutionalizing our consultations, and state that we see no need to formalize relations which are working well in practice.

### EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

You should reaffirm to President de Gaulle the long-standing United States support for the objectives of the European Common Market as well as the other two European Communities (Euratom and the Coal and Steel Community). You may wish to comment favorably on the strong support which France has given to the Common Market. If the question of recent difficulties between the UK and other Outer Seven countries and the Common Market arises, you should state that we hope for improved relations between these groups, but on a basis which clearly preserves the integrity of the Common Market and avoids injury to the broader interests of world trade. In our view, liberal, low-tariff policies by the Common Market are essential to a satisfactory resolution of these problems.

### NATO PROBLEMS

Tripartitism will in turn probably lead to a discussion of the NATO alliance and its functioning, as well as Franco-American nuclear cooperation. On the specific problems which have arisen with France in NATO, it is recommended that you avoid any lengthy discussion. For example, the French have never responded to SACHEUR's suggestion that they make a proposal to him to solve the Mediterranean fleet controversy and it seems unlikely they will soon. Therefore, I feel a discussion of this subject would prove sterile. We likewise have never had a response to General Horstad's proposed solution of the air defense issue, along the lines of a separate air defense sub-command for France. I doubt whether de Gaulle is willing to move on this issue now or we would have heard previously from the French. He is reportedly considering some specific proposals and it would be worth asking him briefly where the matter stands. With regard to atomic stockpiling in France, this also appears a dead issue for the moment, and a discussion thereof would hardly be profitable.

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NATO stockpile  
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### NORSTAD PLAN

We feel it desirable to have agreement among the Western allies as soon as possible regarding tabling at the summit a proposal along the lines of the Norstad Plan. Although the initial French Foreign Office reaction was negative on this subject, it seems important to us that you raise it with de Gaulle. A full statement of Norstad's views have been recently presented in full to Debré and may already be known to de Gaulle. You could stress that we are fully in accord with de Gaulle's views on the need for maintaining European security and not entering into narrow zonal disarmament proposals. However, the Norstad Plan is not a disarmament measure and is desirable solely in its own right. We believe that through the initiation of the inspection and control features of such a plan we could augment our own security and increase our protection against surprise attack.

### NUCLEAR NON-COOPERATION

De Gaulle of course remains intensely concerned with nuclear matters, and has recently discussed these with Mr. McCone in Paris. It is doubtful de Gaulle will ask you to liberalize the Atomic Energy Act or to interpret the Act so that France, like the UK, qualifies as a nation which has made "substantial progress" in the atomic field. If he does, I do not believe we can hold out any hope of favorable action. It might be helpful, however, if you could point to the benefits of the NATO stockpile concept and hint at the possible long-term advantages of a multilateral NATO nuclear weapons capability as against the costly and debilitating effect of developing a purely national program, although we recognize that there would be many problems involved which would require intensive study if any serious proposal on this line should be made to us by the Europeans. You could also mention that we are not entirely stymied in our nuclear relations with France, pointing to the success of our cooperation in the peaceful uses field and the negotiations under way for a third-party nuclear stockpile agreement covering French forces in Germany as well as an atomic cooperation agreement to permit training of these troops. These developments demonstrate our willingness to cooperate in the nuclear field.

NRBN's

MREM's

If de Gaulle raises the question, you could mention that we continue to support the NATO program for MREM's. Within the framework of such a program we are willing to furnish the Polaris missile for multilateral use as an implementation of your statement to NATO in December, 1957.



ALGERIA

We have the impression that Algeria is at a dead point now though there are indications de Gaulle may have something new in mind. In any case it seems to me desirable you should raise this issue with de Gaulle. De Gaulle evidently feels that official French declarations since he subdued the January insurrection in Algiers have not fundamentally altered his September 16 proposal for self-determination, but you might want to point out that statements stressing partition as an eventual solution (i.e., Debre speech of April 14) give an impression of at least a shift of emphasis. Couve was reticent in discussing this subject with me last week, and I am somewhat worried about it. I think you could also point out frankly to de Gaulle the difficulties which we will be faced with in the U.N. next fall if there is no intervening progress on a solution. We hope you would of course reaffirm our basic support for the September 16 offer of self-determination and express the hope that specific progress can be made towards its achievement. You might also wish to state that it seems evident that some sort of negotiations with those who fight would appear advisable. If such negotiations are undertaken we would hope the General would feel free to let us know of any ways in which we might be helpful in promoting their successful conclusion.

MOROCCO AND TUNISIA

It is hoped that a detailed discussion of Moroccan and Tunisian problems could be avoided since there have been some difficulties over quite minuscule problems involving arms aid, technical assistance, etc. to these two former Protectorates. I would hope you could state our strong view regarding the need to keep these two countries firmly oriented towards the West, and the need, in furthering this objective, of furnishing them with arms and other assistance as necessary.

Yours

You could also note finally that although normal relations between these key nations and France are understandably difficult to maintain so long as the Algerian war continues, we hope that France will do what it can to prevent any further deterioration. In this connection, you might wish to mention the great sensitivity of newly independent countries to sovereignty questions such as the presence of foreign troops.



#### FRENCH COMMUNITY

With regard to Africa south of the Sahara, you might express genuine satisfaction at the good progress which the French have made in their negotiations with two of the Community states - Mali and Madagascar - in granting independence to these two areas. You could express the hope that an orderly situation will prevail with regard to the other territories involved, at the appropriate time. If de Gaulle raises the Guinea situation, you might point to this as an unfortunate example of what occurs when the West is caught off guard. A word of reiteration of your support for the Community concept would be most useful.